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GOING FORWARD: IMPROVING THE 
LEGAL ADVICE OF NATIONAL  
SECURITY LAWYERS 
William J. Dunn*
Abstract: Attorney General Mukasey was correct when he noted that na-
tional security lawyers traditionally oscillate between aggression and timid-
ity. Debates about which extreme is “better,” however, miss the larger 
point; namely, that these cycles are driven by factors that the competent 
national security lawyer has a duty to understand. Such a thorough knowl-
edge allows lawyers in this field to dampen the harmful oscillation and 
render the best legal advice possible. After identifying factors that affect 
the rendering of such counsel, the author makes several specific policy rec-
ommendations that will assist lawyers—who are “uniquely suited to bear 
this responsibility” —in this critical task. 
Introduction 
 The commencement remarks of Attorney General Michael Mu-
kasey at Boston College Law School stirred debate about the proper 
role of a government lawyer in providing legal advice regarding com-
plex, challenging, and gravely important issues of national security.1 
Attorney General Mukasey provided his vision of how lawyers should 
“do law” in this environment.2 The premise underlying his vision is that 
lawyers partake in and contribute to “cycles of timidity and aggression,” 
where the national security community oscillates between periods of 
controversial, aggressive energy and risk-averse retrenchment.3 The 
lesson drawn by the Attorney General and the advice he imparted on 
                                                                                                                      
* Attorney at the law firm Ropes & Gray, LLP. The author graduated from Boston Col-
lege Law School in 2006. Prior to law school, he worked as an intelligence analyst for the 
Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense, where he focused on issues of 
military strategy and doctrine; he served as a crisis analyst and briefer at the National Mili-
tary Joint Intelligence Center in the Pentagon. 
1 See, e.g., Peter Schworm, Some at BC Seek to Uninvite Mukasey from Commencement, Bos-
ton Globe, Mar. 23, 2008, at B5. 
2 See Michael B. Mukasey, The Role of Lawyers in the Global War on Terrorism, 32 B.C. Int’l 
& Comp. L. Rev. 179, 184 (2009). 
3 Id. The Attorney General referenced that term as used by former head of the Office 
of Legal Counsel, Jack Goldsmith. See Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency 163 
(2007). 
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the graduating class is that the threat posed by terrorism today raises 
the stakes too high for national security lawyers to fall back into the role 
of risk-averse and obstructionist actors.4
 The Attorney General provides a valid lesson to aspiring lawyers. 
Lawyers in all capacities must counsel clients, and the indispensable in-
gredient of sound counsel is the ability to render a judgment that not 
only sets out, but seeks to resolve the balance between the costs and 
benefits of a particular action.5 A lawyer who advises a client solely based 
on a worst case scenario does not achieve this balance. In the context of 
national security issues, the failure to provide sound counsel leads un-
necessarily to constraints on governmental actors in the pursuit of le-
gitimate and necessary aims.6
 These constraints carry costs, as demonstrated by the tragically 
flawed legal opinions rendered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
(FBI) National Security Law Unit. In these opinions, FBI lawyers pre-
vented an investigation into Khalid al-Mihdhar by relying on a fictional 
legal wall between intelligence and criminal agencies that purportedly 
did not allow the sharing of information.7 Mihdhar had connections 
with the terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa and the at-
tack against the U.S.S. Cole.8 He later assisted in the hijacking of 
American Airlines Flight 77 that was flown into the Pentagon.9
 The problem with the Attorney General’s analysis lies not with his 
description of the proper role of a lawyer as counselor, or even his con-
clusion that lawyers cannot recoil in the face of public scrutiny or legal 
uncertainty into an obstructionist, ultra-conservative position regarding 
national security law. The Attorney General errs by not looking criti-
cally at both the crests and troughs of the “cycles of timidity and aggres-
sion.”10 More specifically, the Attorney General myopically focuses on 
the reactive, dependent side of that historical pendulum without con-
sidering the equally—if not more—important lessons that must be 
drawn from the independent, causation side of governmental over-
                                                                                                                      
4 See generally Mukasey, supra note 2. 
5 See Lorie M. Graham, Aristotle’s Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer: Part One of a Study on Le-
gal Ethics and Clinical Legal Education, 20 J. Legal Prof. 5, 31–34 (1996). 
6 See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 163. 
7 See The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 181–82, 231–39, 270–72 (2004). 
8 Id. at 151. 
9 Id. at 231–40. 
10 In his remarks, the Attorney General focuses almost exclusively on the risk-averse 
side of the “pendulum.” See Mukasey, supra note 2, at 184. 
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reaching.11 He errs because he sees the retrenchment of the intelli-
gence community and presumably the growth of risk-averse counsel as 
a choice, rather than an atmosphere forced upon them by a public 
seeking to right a listing governmental vessel and to recapture rights 
ceded to claims of necessity.12
 When considering both sides of this cycle together, governmental 
overreaching to achieve temporal objectives reveals itself as short-
sighted. By overreaching, the government may address a risk it per-
ceives to be genuine.13 If it is accomplished, however, through the use 
of illegal or unduly aggressive means, the resulting public backlash may 
not only strip away the excess but also incapacitate the agency or 
agent.14 In that resulting anemic atmosphere, national security threats 
continue, but the government is less capable of addressing them.15 As a 
result, by taking a comprehensive view of this cycle of action and reac-
                                                                                                                      
11 “We cannot afford to invite another ‘cycle of timidity’ in the intelligence commu-
nity; the stakes are simply too high.” Id. at 185. 
12 In fact, the Attorney General advises that a good lawyer should “tune out all this 
white noise” and does not address the fact that the public, in response to egregious over-
reaching asserts its constitutional voice through demands on its representatives. Id. at 185. 
13 Furthermore, history often demonstrates that such risks were not as dire as per-
ceived. “After each perceived security crisis ended, the United States has remorsefully real-
ized that the abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary. But it has proven unable to pre-
vent itself from repeating the error when the next crisis came along.” William J. Brennan, 
Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of Security Crisis, 18 Isr. Y.B. 
Hum. Rts. 11, 11 (1988). Some noteworthy examples of perceived risks that, with the 
benefit of hindsight, may be viewed as overreactions include Andrew Jackson’s suspension 
of habeas corpus and the arrest of Federal District Judge Dominick Hall after the Battle of 
New Orleans, President Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus on April 27, 1861, 
despite little actual threat to Washington D.C., and the now infamous internment of Japa-
nese-Americans after Pearl Harbor where the government argued, among other reasons, 
that the Japanese-Americans were sending signals to Japanese submarines. See Matthew 
Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law 35–36 (2006) (describ-
ing circumstances surrounding the arrest of Judge Hall); Malick W. Ghachem & Daniel 
Gordon, From Emergency Law to Legal Process: Herbert Wechsler and the Second World War, 40 
Suff. U. L. Rev. 333, 340 (2007) (discussing military justifications for internment of Japa-
nese-Americans); David Greenberg, Lincoln’s Crackdown, Slate, Nov. 30, 2001, http://www. 
slate.com/id/2059132 (detailing Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus). 
14 See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 163. The risk-averse nature of legal advice criticized 
by the 9/11 Commission was, in many respects, a reaction to the aggressive posturing of 
William J. Casey—lawyer and President Ronald Reagan’s first Director of the CIA—who 
went so far as to literally move the Office of the General Counsel for the CIA outside of the 
headquarters. He followed up this symbolic move with a philosophical and practical shift 
in President Carter’s anemic intelligence policy. See Dorian D. Greene, Ethical Dilemmas 
Confronting Intelligence Agency Counsel, 2 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 91, 105–06 (1994). 
15 See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 163–64. 
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tion, governmental overreaching leads in the long run to periods of 
less security.16
 While overreaching is correctly criticized on both national security 
and civil liberties grounds, this must not translate into a similar error of 
wholesale criticism of aggressive action. Instead, such criticism must 
validate the Attorney General’s point regarding the need to avoid ob-
structionist counsel that would hinder the government’s ability to neu-
tralize threats to national and public safety. The September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks are evidence of the very real security threats that this 
nation faces. The legal landscape that governs many of the issues rela-
tive to national security is complex, and those issues arise during mo-
ments of great stress and much uncertainty, often with incomplete in-
formation. Those who promote an inflexible view on civil liberties, and 
who would promote them at all costs over security needs, are just as 
dangerously wrong on this topic as those who espouse deference to un-
checked executive power. 
 The overarching lesson, therefore, is not simply to avoid re-
trenchment into a system of poor counsel; it is to moderate govern-
mental action through counsel at all stages of the historical cycle to 
eliminate the unnecessary peaks of aggression and the perilous valleys 
of risk-averse action.17 Such counsel considers and balances the 
broader values at stake. It looks to the law as written to determine the 
full scope of legally permissible action, but it understands holistically 
the other constitutional, institutional, and values-based limits that exist 
and apply.18 It also considers the effect of such counsel beyond the ur-
gencies of the moment and views the needs of national security as a 
constant imperative, fully served only through the avoidance of the 
backlash and entrenchment that result from governmental overreach-
ing.19
                                                                                                                      
 
16 See Peter Margulies, Risk, Deliberation, and Professional Responsibility, 1 J. Nat’l Sec. L. 
& Pol’y 357, 369 (2005). 
17 See Margulies, supra note 16, at 360 (describing the government lawyer’s role in 
overreaching). 
18 As Lorie Graham argues, a lawyer must not be simply an “able advocate,” but also a 
“responsible advisor” who “considers the legal, moral, economic, social and political fac-
tors of the situations.” Graham, supra note 5, at 43–44. 
19 This perspective of the need for moderation in policy is analogous to Aristotle’s writ-
ing on ethics where he concludes that “virtue is a mean in the sense that it aims at the 
median.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 42–43 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) (“[B]ad 
men have many ways, good men but one.”). Though legal decisions in many ways remains 
binary—there is a right and a wrong for most actions—a general ethical approach where 
the decision maker aspires to experience specific emotions “at the right time, toward the 
right objects, towards the right people, for the right reason, and in the right manner,” 
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 This presents a difficult task because law is written in universal 
terms, and national security questions push the envelope of exceptions 
in the most complex, ambiguous, and dangerous situations.20 Addi-
tionally, recognition that these difficult issues must be considered and 
judged with respect to a long-term, historical focus does not alleviate 
the challenges faced by those making real-time decisions.21 To that end, 
universal, necessary premises provide little practical assistance in this 
area.22 A dialectic, however, on the pragmatic aspects of the balance 
that an ethical lawyer must address when facing a choice between na-
tional security imperatives and civil liberties begins with a reasoned in-
vestigation into these issues on which generalizations may soundly 
rest.23 Lawyers, by training, skill, access, and rules of professional con-
duct, are uniquely situated to bear this responsibility.24 The sections 
that follow cannot address all such factors, but they seek to begin the 
dialectic and reasoned investigation by addressing the key elements 
that affect the rendering of sound counsel. This Article concludes with 
suggestions on how to implement practical and pragmatic solutions for 
the problems facing the national security community. 
I. Factors that Affect Counsel on National Security  
Law Matters 
 Extolling an imperative for national security lawyers to provide 
sound, holistic counsel does not suggest that those who fail in this re-
gard do so for lack of good faith. Instead, those failures are often the 
result of systemic, institutional, and process factors that impede the ap-
plication of sound judgment. In no area of law are such factors more 
prevalent than in national security law, where information and time 
                                                                                                                      
provides a useful framework to handle these difficult questions. See id. at 43; Theodore P. 
Seto, The Morality of Terrorism, 35 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1227, 1248 (2002) (recognizing Aris-
totle’s contribution to ethics with regard to terrorism, but stating that it provides little in 
the form of practical assistance once a terrorist is caught). 
20 See Aristotle, supra note 19, at 141 (“[A]ll law is universal, but there are some 
things about which it is not possible to speak correctly in universal terms.”). 
21 See Graham, supra note 5, at 48 (citing philosopher Amelie Oksenberg Rorty). 
22 See id. 
23 See id. The value of such ethical standards is best described by Michael Ignatieff, who 
writes, “Ethics matter, not just to constrain the means we use, but to define the identity we 
are defending and to name the evil we are facing.” Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil 
167 (2004). 
24 See generally Louis D. Brandeis, Business—A Profession 313–27 (1914) (noting 
that legal training leads to the development of judgment); James B. Comey, Intelligence 
Under the Law, 10 Green Bag 439 (2007) (discussing legal skills and their relevance to 
working in the intelligence community). 
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may be in short supply, while stress and responsibility are abundant. 
Likewise—and for the same reasons—in few areas of law are such deci-
sions more important.25
A. Slowing Decisional Velocities 
 On critical issues of national security, lawyers who must provide 
counsel on key aspects of governmental action participate in a decision-
making process similar to that which occurs in a crisis.26 Again, lawyers 
must overcome barriers to effective decision-making, such as incom-
plete information, unreliable predictions about the consequences of 
various courses of action, and a lack of fixed criterion upon which an 
option may be tested.27
 Every crisis includes three driving factors or “velocities” that shape 
the decision-making process.28 They include the velocity of events, the 
velocity of response, and the velocity of assessment and decision.29 The 
first requires a factual understanding of the events that have occurred, 
the steps, progression, and speed of the events that are unfolding, and 
a conclusion as to what events are considered unacceptable. The sec-
ond velocity is shaped by the possible responses, the factors affecting 
those responses, and the amount of time provided to respond before 
unacceptable events occur. The third velocity is both the most critical 
and the most dependent on the other two, because the time allocated 
to reach a decision is shaped by the understanding and management of 
the first two velocities.30
 Actors in this process must seek to identify, isolate, and decelerate 
the first two velocities to the greatest extent possible. This process re-
duces the need to reach a decision before sufficient information is 
gathered, options are explored, and deliberation occurs.31 Where the 
first two velocities are not understood or managed, the velocity of deci-
sion unduly accelerates and results in rushed judgment. 
                                                                                                                      
25 See Comey, supra note 24, at 442–43. As John Keegan writes, “Force finds out those 
who lack the virtue to wield it.” John Keegan, The Mask of Command 312 (1987). 
26 See Comey, supra note 24, at 442–43; Margulies, supra note 16, at 370-71. Cf. Lt. Col. 
George E. Moore, Understanding Crisis Decision Making, Strategy Research Project, 
U.S. Army War Coll. (Apr. 15, 1996) (discussing crisis decision making in the military). 
27 See Alexander George, The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Po-
litical Leaders and Decision-Making, 13 Int’l Studies Q. 190, 197–98 (1969). 
28 See Keegan, supra note 25, at 348–49. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. at 349. 
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 One famous example of applying a rational, multi-pronged ap-
proach to decision-making occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
On October 14, 1962, a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft revealed that 
Soviet medium-range ballistics missile sites were being built in Cuba.32 
President John F. Kennedy learned of this development two days later, 
and immediately organized a group of advisors termed the Executive 
Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm).33 President 
Kennedy defined the outer limits of the first velocity by determining 
that Soviet nuclear armed ballistic missiles in Cuba would not be ac-
ceptable, but provided ExComm the freedom to deliberate openly on 
response options and to advise suggested strategies by consensus.34 De-
spite a vociferous opinion by the military advisors, including the entire 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, for a comprehensive military response, ExComm 
spent the first day gathering facts about the threat.35
 Marshall Carter, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), helped define the second velocity by noting that the So-
viet missiles could be fully operational within two weeks, thus marking 
the outermost boundary for a response.36 Deliberations continued, 
each side drawing up detailed plans for action and vetting those plans 
against the others.37 Government lawyers played an integral role in 
these deliberations, creatively interpreting international law to provide 
the flexibility to institute a quarantine against Cuba.38 This option 
proved valuable, since it avoided using the term “blockade,” an action 
that, under international law, could be considered an act of war. The 
President finally approved the quarantine on October 21, 1962, a deci-
sion that many conclude defused a potentially catastrophic emergency.39
 This approach to decision-making in the face of dire threats to na-
tional security is applicable to a lawyer’s efforts to provide sound coun-
sel.40 The same three velocities exist in and affect every request for le-
                                                                                                                      
32 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the 
First Fifty Years 391 (1988); Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis 23–26 (1969). 
33 Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis 44–46 (1966); Kennedy, supra note 32, at 29–31. 
34 See Kennedy, supra note 32, at 33–34. 
35 Keegan, supra note 25, at 347; Kennedy, supra note 32, at 36–37. 
36 See 12 U.S. Dep’t of State, Pub No. 10410, Foreign Relations of the U.S.: 1961-
1963, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath 1–25, available at http://www.state.gov/www/ 
about_state/history/frusXI/01_25.html; see also Keegan, supra note 25, at 347. 
37 Kennedy, supra note 32, at 45. 
38 See Margulies, supra note 16, at 371. 
39 Kennedy, supra note 32, at 48. 
40 See Keegan, supra note 25, at 346–49; Margulies, supra note 15, at 371. 
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gal advice.41 Where the velocities of events and the need for a response 
are identified and understood, the velocity of decision may be assessed 
and addressed with maximum allowance for factual review, delibera-
tion, consideration, and creativity.42 This may still result in decisions 
rendered without the full benefit of time and complete information, 
but this organizational plan provides a framework that seeks to manage 
these factors and attempts to avoid any unnecessary acceleration of the 
decision-making process.43
B. Systemic Biases 
 Axiomatic to any attempt at thoughtful and well-considered coun-
sel is the need for a true balancing of imperatives. The famous Middle 
Eastern scholar and jurist Ibn Khaldun wrote about how systemic bias 
affects the standard of evidence required to accept particular claims.44 
As used in this context, a systemic bias is an inherent tendency to favor a 
particular outcome by raising or lowering the standard of evidence re-
quired to support that claim.45 Khaldun wrote that the result of such 
systemic biases is an intrusion upon accurate historical analysis because 
the conclusions drawn are not based upon a rational and objective 
weighing of facts.46 Instead, a thumb is placed on one side of the scale.47
 Though Khaldun looked at this problem through a macro, histori-
cal lens, he identified a problem that affects all balancing tests—namely 
the predisposition of a decision maker to value one side of an argu-
ment or some contributing claims more than others.48 In the context of 
national security law, the systemic bias is held by advocates on both 
                                                                                                                      
41 See Keegan, supra note 25, at 348. 
42 See Margulies, supra note 16, at 371. 
43 See Keegan, supra note 25, at 348–49 (“Pace is, indeed, the crux.”). 
44 See Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah 24–26, 35–39 (N.J. Dowood, ed., Franz Rosen-
thal, trans., 1981). For an analogous explanation of how such a systemic bias may affect 
racial considerations in hiring due to an unconscious bias, see generally Kelly Glasheen & 
Tejal K. Patel, Symposium Introduction: Unconscious Discrimination Twenty Years Later: Applica-
tion and Evolution, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 927 (2008). 
45 See Khaldun, supra note 44, at 24–26, 35–39. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. Also integral to Khaldun’s criticism is the reliance on transmitters—or what 
could be considered unreliable secondary sources today—to draw historical lessons with-
out regard to the factual inaccuracy inherent to such a process. Id. at 35–36. 
48 See id.; see also Matthew J. Festa, Applying a Usable Past: The Use of History in Law, 38 
Seton Hall L. Rev. 479, 484 (2008) (discussing history and law’s mutual goals of estab-
lishing facts in order to provide a workable understanding of the truth). 
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sides of the debate.49 As Aristotle wrote, “people’s characters take their 
bias from the steady direction of their activities.”50
1. The War Imperative 
 Through the eyes of an intelligence analyst or policymaker, threats 
are everywhere. Potential threats appear in shopping malls and on 
trains, and they color the vision of commercial aircraft taking off near 
vacant, unguarded lots and of tankers meandering their way through 
city harbors.51 Threats come through message traffic submitted by atta-
ché officers, valid and false informants looking for a steady stream of 
money, collection assets that capture images or signals, and from ana-
lytical models that seek to predict action.52 Not only do intelligence 
analysts and policymakers live in this atmosphere of constant threats, 
but the burden of responsibility for eliminating them sharpens their 
importance and urgency.53
 Governmental actors at all levels in this atmosphere are susceptible 
to a systemic bias that is unduly deferential to a “war imperative,” with 
the term “war” broadly including any military action taken to protect 
                                                                                                                      
49 There may even be a psychological bias in favor of hawkish or aggressive behavior 
that supports the adoption of a war imperative. See Daniel Kahneman & Jonathan Ren-
shon, Why Hawks Win, Foreign Pol’y, Jan. 1, 2007, at 34. See generally Dominic D. P. John-
son, Overconfidence and War (2004). 
50 Graham, supra note 5, at 47. 
51 See, e.g., Asia Pirates “Training for Terrorist Attack,” Lloyd’s List Int’l, Oct. 15, 2003, at 8 
(describing terrorists training to hijack a ship and detonate it in a port or shipping choke-
point); James A. Lewis, Commercial Aviation and MANPADS: Threat or Theory ( Jan. 2006), avail-
able at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060101_manpads.pdf; Transportation Security 
Administration Office of Intelligence, Mass Transit System Threat Assessment (2008), avail-
able at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/tvnews/masstransitsystemthreatass- 
essment.pdf. See generally Richard Clark, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on 
Terror (2004). 
52 Intelligence analysts are inundated with raw information. It must be noted, however, 
that information is not intelligence. Intelligence requires a further step, where analytical 
methods, corroboration, and experience are brought to bear to shape that information 
into usable and accurate judgments. Bruce Berkowitz, The Big Difference Between Intelligence 
and Evidence, Wash. Post, Feb. 2, 2003, at B1, B5. 
53 See Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom, and Security 87–90, 114 (2003). 
These threats are not fully known and may not be exaggerated. The U.S. State Department 
maintains a list of over 100,000 names of persons potentially linked to terrorists and before 
the invasion of Afghanistan, al Qaeda may have trained over 70,000 people. See Paul 
Rosenzweig, Civil Liberties and the Response to Terrorism, 42 Duq. L. Rev. 663, 677 (2004); see 
also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J. concurring in part) (“[T]he 
responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that security legitimately raises.”). 
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against situations of extreme danger.54 The war imperative is an asser-
tion of necessity that leverages the fear of dire consequences for the 
security of the country and the lives of its citizens in support of a par-
ticular course of action.55
 At times, the assertion of a war imperative is justified. The Foun-
ders recognized the need for the government to respond quickly and 
decisively to imminent threats.56 The vesting of the executive power in 
one individual attests to the Founders’ belief that such threats may re-
quire presidential action without the benefit of congressional delibera-
tion.57 As Justice Jackson said in Terminiello v. Chicago, the Constitution 
is not a “suicide pact,” and its structure must accommodate the ability 
of the government to act in self-preservation.58
 The problem with a war imperative is that it is usually presented 
with urgency, generality, and secrecy. The extreme urgency of its asser-
tions seeks to supplant countervailing values, policies, and interests.59 
The generality fails to differentiate among various types and levels of 
                                                                                                                      
54 In the infamous Supreme Court decision Korematsu v. United States, the Court adopted 
such language when justifying the relocation and detention of Japanese-Americans during 
World War II. See 323 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1944). The Court referred to the “military impera-
tive[s]” that justified the relocation and detention without substantive reference to the intru-
sion on the rights of the affected people. See id.; see also Heymann, supra note 53, at 15 (“Pub-
lic fears and anger are immediate and powerful; threat to civil liberties or divisions within the 
society or among allies are more remote and far less urgent or demanding.”); Eugene 
Gressman, Korematsu: A Melange of Military Imperatives, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 15, 19–21 
(2004). In many ways, the “war imperative” is analogous to what is termed the “crisis thesis” 
that motivates the courts to adopt a jurisprudence that allows for a greater curtailment of 
rights and liberties. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times 547 (2004); Lee Epstein, Daniel 
E. Ho, Gary King & Jeffrey Segal, The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-
War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 11–12 (2005). 
55 See Heymann, supra note 53, at 87, 114–15. This is not to say that such fear may not 
be genuinely perceived as likely to occur. See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 165 (discussing 
how the original torture memoranda were issued in an atmosphere of fear). 
56 Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power 8–9 (2d ed., rev. 2004). The key discussion 
in this regard at the Constitutional Convention occurred between James Madison, Roger 
Sherman, and Eldridge Gerry where the term “declare” was used to describe Congress’s 
war powers to ensure the ability of the President to “repel and not commence war.” James 
Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, at 475–77 (1966). 
Additionally, one need look no further than the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution to see 
the emphasis the Founders placed on the role of the government to provide security to the 
new nation. See U.S. Const. pmbl. 
57 See Fisher, supra note 56, at 8–9; Madison, Notes, supra note 56, at 475–77. 
58 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) ( Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
372 U.S. 144, 159–60 (1963); Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1999). 
59 Heymann, supra note 53, at 114 (“The very notion of “war” is intended to suggest 
urgency and a priority that supervenes most other claimants for attention in our domestic 
and foreign policy.”). 
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threats and obstructs a careful analysis of its merits.60 Secrecy limits de-
liberation and quiets many who would otherwise probe or possibly ob-
ject.61 Each of these aspects of a war imperative makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to conduct a true balancing of the costs and benefits of its 
recommended course.62 It also provides an attractive vehicle to insulate 
arguments from debate or criticism or to hide illegal or problematic 
actions.63
 National Intelligence Director Mike McConnell recently provided 
an example of an appeal to a war imperative in an attempt to prevent 
public debate on amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA).64 McConnell stated, “The fact we’re doing it this way means 
that some Americans are going to die . . . .”65 This statement was a gen-
eral, urgent assertion that sought to squelch public hearings on modifi-
cations to the protective statutory scheme that governed domestic elec-
tronic surveillance.66 What McConnell’s statement lacked, however, 
were details on the type or level of threat posed. If the concern was the 
release of sensitive information to the public, limited closed sessions 
                                                                                                                      
60 See id. at 87 (“The metaphor of war makes [balancing imperatives] more difficult. It 
tends to obscure the differences among the threats we face and to distract attention from a 
careful analysis of . . . what we can do.”). Some have even argued that reporters embedded 
with the military in Iraq develop this systemic bias. Jack Shafer, Full Metal Junket: The Myth 
of the Objective War Correspondent, Slate, Mar. 5, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2079703. 
61 See Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency 142–43 (2008) (de-
tailing the small group of policymakers in the Bush administration who had knowledge of 
the secret foreign intelligence surveillance program following 9/11). 
62 See Heymann, supra note 53, at 87. 
63 See id. at 114; Margulies, supra note 16, at 361. The war imperative is similar to an 
appeal to national security to prevent further discussion or investigation. Such appeals 
have been famously used to cover up illegal or embarrassing actions, such as President 
Nixon’s role in Watergate. See Gellman, supra note 61, at 100. The government tried to 
assert the state secrets evidentiary privilege to prevent the introduction of damaging evi-
dence in United States v. Reynolds. See 345 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1953); see also Appendix of Docket 
Entries Subsequent to the Original Record, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/ 
reynoldspetapp.pdf. State secrets were also used to justify the imposition of martial law and 
suspension of habeas corpus in New Orleans by Andrew Jackson during the War of 1812. 
See Warshauer, supra note 13, at 19, 35–36. But see Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 
386–87 (3d Cir. 2006) (dismissing fraud upon the court action, which had been brought 
after the disclosure of documents originally withheld by government because of national 
security concerns). 
64 See Interview by Chris Roberts with Mike McConnell, National Intelligence Director, 
El Paso Times, Aug. 22, 2007, available at http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_6685679. 
65 Id. Justice Scalia, in dissent in Boumediene v. Bush, used similar language when de-
scribing the consequences of allowing detainees at Guantanamo Bay to challenge the le-
gality of their detentions through habeas corpus: “It will almost certainly cause more 
Americans to be killed.” 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
66 See Gellman, supra note 61, at 142–43. 
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could been used. If it was the need to prevent a complete stoppage of 
the surveillance program, that would counsel quick and decisive action, 
but would not prevent public hearings. Instead, McConnell used a gen-
eral threat of unverifiable dire consequences as an attempt to win an 
argument.67
 The approval and likely practice of torture with the consent of law-
yers highlights the effect and negative consequences of a war impera-
tive. As former Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Coun-
sel (OLC) Jack Goldsmith asked, “How could this have happened?”68 
The likely answer, according to Goldsmith, is that the atmosphere dur-
ing the Summer of 2002 was thick with threat reporting and the policy-
makers, as well as the intelligence analysts, were convinced that another 
attack loomed.69 In addition, the United States had several senior al 
Qaeda leaders in custody, including Abu Zubaydah.70 Though it is un-
clear, it may be presumed that war imperatives motivated the authoring 
of the “Torture Memo,” leading the OLC lawyers to approve actions 
that, upon reflection, carried grave costs without overriding security 
benefits.71
 National security lawyers must be conscious of the systemic bias 
that favors war imperatives and combat their distortion of legal counsel. 
To do so, a lawyer must reject general assertions of necessity and insist 
upon further facts regarding the type and level of threat.72 One must 
                                                                                                                      
 
67 See Interview with Mike McConnell, supra note 64. 
68 Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 165. 
69 Id. at 165–66. 
70 Id. at 166. 
71 See id. at 165–66; Ignatieff, supra note 23, at 136–37 (discussing the security di-
lemma with respect to torture techniques); Daniel Kanstroom, On “Waterboarding”: Legal 
Interpretation and the Continuing Struggle for Human Rights, 32 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 
203, 207 (2009); Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints 
on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 278, 290–91 (2004) (discussing Chavez v. 
Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), and the Court’s rejection of arguments that imminent 
threats could allow extreme measures of interrogation). 
72 Margulies, supra note 16, at 360–61 (discussing the need for governmental lawyers 
to insist on particularity in support of governmental assertions of need); see Heymann, 
supra note 53, at 87. As Aharon Barak argues in the context of judging, a lawyer should not 
view “security considerations” as magic words, but should instead insist on specifics to en-
sure that any such assertion is not pretext. In discharging this duty, a lawyer should neither 
be naïve nor cynical. See Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme 
Court in a Democracy, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 16, 157–58 (2002). Ironically, lawyers can find guid-
ance on how analytically to attempt such a narrowing by looking to a similar effort applied 
to understanding the contours of arguments that entail individual, constitutional rights. 
For example, the paradigm of qualified immunity decisions shares the qualities of a na-
tional security decision by requiring a definition of individual rights to be adjudged within 
a balancing test that measures it against a governmental need. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 
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deliberate with other lawyers as a check on his or her reasoning and 
perception of the problem.73 In an intelligence community that re-
quires compartmentalization of information, this may require the 
courage to demand information or access that is not normally pro-
vided.74 This must all be done with recognition that other values, such 
as civil liberties and civil rights, may challenge and even trump some 
security imperatives.75 This is especially necessary when the nation is 
facing what the executive branch considers an open-ended war on ter-
rorism.76 In the end, combating a war imperative may come down, as 
James Comey states, to the ability to say “‘No . . . into a storm of crisis, 
with loud voices all around, with lives hanging in the balance.”77
2. Rejecting Civil Liberties Absolutism 
 Just as a lawyer must have the ability to say “no” under pressure, a 
national security lawyer must have the ability to say “yes” when the bal-
ance favors security.78 The principle duty of a national security lawyer is 
to protect the common good.79 This requires the synthesis of security 
                                                                                                                      
U.S. 372, 383 (2007). Additionally, as in the case of Fourth Amendment analysis, it has 
been argued: 
To create a workable framework, one must look at the countless instances 
where the Fourth Amendment has application and ask how reasonableness 
can have any coherent meaning across that range of intrusions. The methods 
by which the courts address this challenge will largely determine how much 
liberty we have and how much the government can intrude. Courts and 
commentators could throw up their arms at such a task and decline to look 
beyond the specifics of each case. But such case-by-case analysis is inimical to 
individual freedom and fails to develop coherent standards to guide govern-
ment agents. 
Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 977, 
1043. 
73 The imposition of secrecy and the prevention of deliberation with other agencies 
are two reasons why the legal analysis supporting many of the Bush administration’s poli-
cies has been so widely criticized. See Gellman, supra note 61, at 136 (describing David 
Addington’s practice of preventing the circulation of OLC memoranda). 
74 See Greene, supra note 14, at 99 (discussing the compartmented nature of informa-
tion in the intelligence community). 
75 Ignatieff, supra note 23, at 136–37; Comey, supra note 24, at 443. 
76 See Ignatieff, supra note 23, at 136–37 (describing the risk to liberty and morality 
posed by a war on terrorism); Grenville Byford, The Wrong War, Foreign Aff. ( July/Aug. 
2002). “The ‘war on terrorism’ might continue in perpetuity, and it is unclear who is au-
thorized to declare it over.” Paul Hoffman, Human Rights and Terrorism, 26 Hum. Rts. Q. 
932, 940 (2004). 
77 Comey, supra note 24, at 444. 
78 See id. 
79 See Greene, supra note 14, at 103–05. 
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concerns and the protection of civil rights because the absence of ei-
ther, in the long run, would undermine the democracy that the lawyer 
serves.80 Though civil rights contribute to this aspect of the common 
good, their principle function is to protect the individual from some-
one else’s understanding of what constitutes the good of society.81 As a 
result, without minimizing this contribution to the development of 
dignity and respect for individuals—especially as a countermajoritarian 
force—the absolutism of rights as a trump card against all security con-
cerns must be rejected by those responsible for the good of the collec-
tive.82
 Terrorism presents an amorphous and asymmetric threat with few 
conventional indications and warnings.83 The difficulty of detecting 
terrorist threats is compounded by the magnitude of the potential con-
sequences of failure. The destruction wrought by the terrorist attacks 
on September 11 pale in comparison to the very real threats of a nu-
clear detonation or a radiological dispersal attack.84 The countervailing 
aspect of the terrorist threat is its undeterminable duration.85 When 
considering the degree to which civil liberties must flex to accommo-
date these threats, the inability to declare victory raises concerns that 
the ceding of rights for wartime imperatives may be permanent.86
 In light of these countervailing concerns, a distinction must be 
drawn between imminent and programmatic threats.87 Civil liberties 
                                                                                                                      
 
80 See Richard A. Posner, Not A Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of Na-
tional Emergency 31 (2006) (providing a framework for how one could define a particu-
lar right and balance it against the needs of security); Hoffman, supra note 76, at 934 
(“History shows that when societies trade human rights for security, most often they get 
neither.”). 
81 Chris Brown, Universal Human Rights: A Critique, in Human Rights in Global Poli-
tics 109–10 (Tim Dunne & Nicholas J. Wheeler eds., 1999). 
82 See Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 303–04 (2003); Brown, 
supra note 81, at 110; Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in Public and Private Morality 136 
(Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978). 
83 See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 73 (discussing President Roosevelt’s visits to the 
“map room” during World War II so that he, quoting historian Doris Kearns Goodwin, 
“could visualize the progress of the war.”). 
84 See Gellman, supra note 61, at 160 (quoting Wayne Downing’s concern with al 
Qaeda’s interest in chemical weapons, radiological dispersion devices and nuclear weap-
ons); Ignatieff, supra note 23, at 146; National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence 
Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland 5 ( July 2007), http://www.dni.gov/press_ 
releases/20070717_release.pdf. 
85 Hoffman, supra note 76, at 940. 
86 See Ignatieff, supra note 23, at 145–46; Hoffman, supra note 76, at 940. 
87 See Paul Rosenzweig, Principles for Safeguarding Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism, Ex-
ecutive Memorandum No. 854 (The Heritage Found., Jan. 31 2003), http://www.heritage. 
org/Research/HomelandSecurity/em854.cfm (discussing the need for a methodology in 
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must flex more in response to the former because the latter allow more 
time for reflection and deliberation on how best to address a particular 
action.88 Additionally, the urgency of an imminent threat may lead to a 
greater intrusion than necessary to ensure success, but the resulting 
intrusion is a limited one that will cease once the threat expires.89
 The Supreme Court, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, grappled with 
this division when holding unconstitutional a highway checkpoint.90 
The Court held that the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment 
where the primary purpose was general crime control.91 The Court 
stated, however, that “the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly 
permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an immi-
nent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee 
by way of a particular route.”92 The same intrusion would occur through 
the surgical use of a highway checkpoint, but the type of threat would 
limit the duration and extent of its use.93
 Additionally, the division between imminent and programmatic 
threats instructs how the Bush administration should have approached 
the need for increased foreign intelligence surveillance after Septem-
ber 11. Few would likely criticize the President’s use of the increased 
                                                                                                                      
order to determine from a legal and policymaking perspective what measures in response 
to the terrorist threat are “too much”). Just War theorists often talk about this point within 
that context as whether a “positive danger” exists. See Maryann Cusimano Love, Globaliza-
tion, Ethics, and the War on Terrorism, 16 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 65, 71 (2002). 
A further division may even be required between imminent threats that constitute emer-
gencies that require extreme action and those that may be reacted to with a more moder-
ate approach. Cf. Igor Primoratz, A Philosopher Looks at Contemporary Terrorism, 29 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 33, 49 (2007) (discussing the merits of just war theorist Michael Walzer’s argu-
ments on imminent threats). 
88 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000); cf. Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland art. 80a (noting the German Basic Law’s allowance for a 
“state of defense” for imminent attacks); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) 
(per curiam) (allowing the government to punish inflammatory speech where it is “di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.”). 
89 For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides a 
comprehensive framework for the protection of human and civil rights. It recognizes, 
however, that certain public emergencies may require a narrow and temporary deviation 
from that framework. The deviation must be only to the extent “strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 4. Further, some derogations are expressly not allowed under 
that provision. Id. art. 4(2). 
90 531 U.S. at 46–48. 
91 Id. at 44. 
92 Id. 
93 See id.; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (viewing the Fourth Amend-
ment’s reasonableness standard in light of the exigency of the governmental need). 
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surveillance capabilities of the National Security Agency (NSA), even if 
technically outside of the strictures of FISA, had it been necessary to 
thwart an imminent attack and employed for a limited duration.94 The 
use of the NSA assets was not, however, so limited.95 Instead, the Presi-
dent sought to employ this surveillance program as a programmatic 
response to general terrorist threats.96 Both a limited and protracted 
use of these assets resulted in intrusions on privacy rights, but while 
those rights properly flexed in light of imminent need, they were un-
duly infringed upon once time allowed for deliberation on the conse-
quences of the governmental action.97
 Drawing the distinction between imminent and programmatic 
threats is easier said than done. Many threats seem imminent, but are 
later revealed to be based upon unreliable information.98 The costs of 
these errors are significant when the means employed result in restric-
tions on civil rights. Lawyers will never meaningfully reduce the errors 
made in deciphering intelligence, nor should they be engaged in that 
process. Lawyers, for all their skill, are not intelligence analysts, and 
determinations about credibility and likelihood of attacks should be left 
to the experts.99 Lawyers can require, however, a response narrowly tai-
lored to the threats faced.100 Where imminent threats exist, a lawyer 
may sanction activity that pushes the envelope of legality and chal-
lenges civil liberties, but only with assurances that aggressive actions will 
cease once the threat is over. 
                                                                                                                      
94 The provisions of FISA itself contemplated such flexibility. See FISA, 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1805(f); S. Rep. No. 95–604, at 52 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3953; see also Goldsmith, supra 
note 3, at 183. 
95 See Gellman, supra note 61, 145–46; Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 181–82. 
96 See Gellman, supra note 61, 145–46. 
97 In this example, even after the disclosures of the secret Terrorist Surveillance Pro-
gram, the Bush administration was still able to negotiate with Congress for the needed 
reforms to the FISA. In the White House Press Release after President Bush signed recent 
amendments to the bill, the President stated, “The bill will allow our intelligence profes-
sionals to quickly and effectively monitor the communications of terrorists abroad while 
respecting the liberties of Americans here at home. The bill I sign today will help us meet 
our most solemn responsibility: to stop new attacks and to protect our people.” Remarks 
on Signing the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 44 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 975 ( July 10, 
2008). 
98 See Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent 291–92 (2008) (discussing the specula-
tive aspect of intelligence and the need to act upon that evidence). 
99 This expertise is, however, rightly challenged after the inaccurate judgments on the 
credibility of various intelligence sources leading up to the war with Iraq. See Paul R. Pillar, 
Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq, Foreign Affairs, Mar. 1, 2006, at 15. 
100 In some ways, there were attempts to narrow the Terrorist Surveillance Program’s 
intrusion by restricting it from capturing and analyzing the “content” of communications. 
See Gellman, supra note 61, at 149. 
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 The necessary question that arises from this discussion is whether 
any rights are indeed absolute, even in the face of an imminent terror-
ist threat.101 This properly focuses on the use of torture—a topic gar-
nering much criticism after the disclosures of its use on at least three 
detainees.102 The use of torture and its damage to the human dignity of 
an individual is different from all other types of intrusions.103 First, it is 
irreparable. Wounds to human dignity cannot heal; the scars they leave 
both to the target and the society that allowed it to occur are lasting.104 
This prohibition corresponds with the Kantian ethical framework that 
human beings never be treated as a means for some other ends.105 
Some means are inherently so corrupt that no matter the intention, 
they cannot be justified.106
 Second, it is fundamental to society in general, and to democracies 
in particular, that the entire purpose of collective action is to protect 
each other against our worst tendencies.107 The thread that binds this 
                                                                                                                      
 
101 See Ignatieff, supra note 23, at 136–37; Kanstroom, supra note 71, at qqq; Kreimer, 
supra note 71, at 278, 290–91. 
102 See Heymann, supra note 53, at 109–11. See generally Alan Dershowitz, Tortured Rea-
soning, in Torture: A Collection, 257, 265 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); Kreimer, supra 
note 71; David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, Va. L. Rev. 1425, 1430 
(2005); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 
Colum. L. Rev. 1681 (2005); Jonathan Alter, Time to Think About Torture, Newsweek, Nov. 
5, 2001, at 45; Charles Krauthammer, The Truth About Torture, Weekly Standard, Dec. 5, 
2005, at 21; Ruth Wedgwood & R. James Woolsey, Law and Torture, Wall St. J., June 28, 
2004, at A10. 
103 See Ignatieff, supra note 23, at 140; Kreimer, supra note 71, at 295–96; Waldron, su-
pra note 102, at 1693 (discussing the prohibition on torture as a malum prohibitum offense). 
Daniel Kanstroom analogizes the word torture to words such as genocide and slavery that 
may have been contentious once, but that today are “settled political, legal, and moral 
disputes.” Kanstroom, supra note 71, at 276. 
104 See Ignatieff, supra note 23, at 143 (discussing the torture experienced by Jean 
Amery at the hands of the German SS before being sent to Auschwitz: “[S]omeone who 
has been tortured is never capable of being at home in the world again.”). 
105 See Bernhard Schlink, The Problem with “Torture Lite,” 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 85, 88 
(2007). 
106 Michael Ignatieff provides a useful rejoinder to those who see a contradiction be-
tween engaging in a war and yet prohibiting the use of torture by stating: “The first one 
takes a life; the second abuses one.” See Ignatieff, supra note 23, at 137. This is also partly 
due to the relationship between the torturer and the victim, with the former degrading 
him- or herself as much through the process. See Luban, supra note 102, at 1430. It should 
be noted that President Bush himself recognized and spoke to the prohibition against 
torture, though admittedly hedging on whether the prohibition was categorical. See The 
President’s News Conference ( Jan. 26, 2006), 42 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 125, 134 ( Jan. 
30, 2006) (“No American will be allowed to torture another human being anywhere in the 
world.”). 
107 See Ignatieff, supra note 23, at 144 (“[L]iberal democracy has been crafted over 
centuries precisely in order to combat the temptations of nihilism, to prevent violence 
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society is not economic or simply enlightened self-interest, but the 
common values of life and law.108 As citizens, we give up power to the 
government to ensure order, but the price of such sacrifice has a 
limit.109 The price that cannot be paid for security is the violation of 
that which is most sacred—our own human dignity and the respect we 
have for that value in others.110
 The use of torture results in such extreme costs that even the most 
serious national security imperatives would likely fail to justify it.111 This 
falls short of an absolutist position because it is impossible to condemn 
its use in the recently abused, yet still problematic, hypothetical “ticking 
time bomb” situation where other values could take precedence.112 The 
                                                                                                                      
from becoming an end in itself.”). A similar concept affected the organization of Congress, 
where James Madison wrote, “passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had 
every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a 
mob.” The Federalist No. 55, at 339 ( James Madison) (Bantam Dell 1987). 
108 See Waldron, supra note 102, at 1737 (arguing that allowing torture or defining torture 
narrowly to allow for it constructively to occur would corrupt the American legal system). 
The short-sighted nature of the use of torture includes practical concerns as well as ethical 
and moral ones. The use of torture by French authorities in Algeria is considered a major 
factor in the former’s loss of that colony. See Heymann, supra note 53, at 112; Waldron, supra 
note 102, at 1684. Persons subjected to torture also may become the next generation of ter-
rorists willing to plan and carry out the very acts the torture is intended to frustrate. See Ig-
natieff, supra note 23, at 141. Finally, a decision that torture is permissible deprives Ameri-
can troops of clear laws of war that prohibit such methods if they are captured. See William H. 
Taft IV, Memorandum to Alberto Gonzalez, Counsel to the President, (Feb. 2, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/politics/20040608_DOC.pdf. 
109 See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 5–7 (2005); Hey-
mann, supra note 53, at 113, 179. 
110 “The pain of torture by design negates the vision of humanity that lies at the core of 
a liberal democracy.” Kreimer, supra note 71, at 298. For a strong argument against the 
ticking time bomb hypothetical generally used to undermine an absolutist view on the 
prohibition of torture, see Luban, supra note 102, at 1440–45. 
111 “Torture is alien to our Constitution both because it impinges on bodily integrity, 
and because it assaults the autonomy and dignity of the victim.” See Kreimer, supra note 71, 
at 294–95; see also Kanstroom, supra note 71, at qqq (discussing that the fundamental prem-
ise of human rights law as “the inherent dignity of each person and the basic ideal of inal-
ienable rights.”). 
112 See Krauthammer, supra note 102. The most revolting aspect of the recent revela-
tions of the use of torture and extreme interrogation techniques by the United States gov-
ernment has been its sanction by lawyers and other policymakers after deliberation and 
thought, rather than in the “ticking time bomb” scenario often used as a defense for ex-
ceptions to a general prohibition. See Luban, supra note 102, at 1452–53; Waldron, supra 
note 102, at 1683, 1718–19 (“[A] case can be made that torture is now to be regarded as 
alien to any system of law.”). 
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use of torture must remain, however, categorically prohibited, subject 
only to potential affirmative defenses of necessity or duress.113
 Absolutists on civil liberties enjoy reciting Benjamin Franklin’s 
quote, “Those who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little tempo-
rary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.”114 The key word in this 
quotation is the modifier “essential.” Lawyers must be able to draw lines 
where essential liberties are at stake and where even imminent threats 
cannot justify certain actions. That said, lawyers must also be capable of 
making the tough and unpopular decisions that encroach on liberties, 
but they must only do so in response to an imperative that must be ad-
dressed. If done through limited and circumscribed means, the tempo-
rary encroachments will realign once security is assured.115
C. The Criminalization of the Laws of War 
 Mostly due to the “cycles of aggression” in the 1960s–1970s and the 
mid-1980s, as well as growth of international law governing the laws of 
war, Congress has passed a myriad of domestic statutes that expose civil-
ian governmental officials, politicians, and former military personnel 
to criminal liability.116 National security lawyers are often placed in a 
position to render legal opinions that will guide policymakers and op-
                                                                                                                      
113 See generally Paola Gaeta, May Necessity Be Available as a Defense for Torture in the Inter-
rogation of Suspected Terrorists, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 785 (2004); Michael Slackman, What’s 
Wrong with Torturing al Qaeda Higher-Ups?, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2004, at 44. 
114 Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Benjamin Franklin 270 (A.J. Valpy ed., 
1818). A similar point was made while criticizing a protest by Georgetown University stu-
dents. See Michelle Malkin, Dowdifying Ben Franklin ( Jan. 25, 2006), http://michellemalkin. 
com/2006/01/25/dowdifying-ben-franklin/. 
115 As President Lincoln wrote, “Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended 
by the meeting, that the American people will, by means of military arrests during the 
rebellion, lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of 
evidence, trial by jury, and habeas corpus throughout the indefinite peaceful future which I 
trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so 
strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness, as to persist in feeding upon them 
through the remainder of his healthful life.” See Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Erastus Corn-
ing and Others, in Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings 699, 705 (Roy P. Basler 
ed., 1946). 
116 See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 64–65, 163–64; Comey, supra note 24, at 443–44; 
Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Peace Through Law? The Failure of a Noble Experiment, 106 
Mich. L. Rev. 923, 926–28 (2008). The two most notable statutes of this nature are the War 
Crimes Act and the Torture Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A 
(2002); see also Gellman, supra note 61, at 163. 
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erators on how to perform their duties without exposing themselves or 
their clients to criminal punishment.117
 The criminalization of war is both an understandable reaction to 
previous abuses and a severe hindrance to the collection of intelligence 
and the prevention of future terrorist attacks.118 On one hand, there 
are many benefits to maintaining such domestic criminal laws. First, it is 
the right of the people, through their legislature, to define what actions 
are so repugnant to the conscience of society that they will be deemed 
criminal regardless of the motivation or intention of the actor. Second, 
some statutes, like the War Crimes Act, are intended to comply with 
international obligations.119 Finally, applying such standards to gov-
ernment actors allows the United States to argue for similar standards 
and treatment, and to pursue international terrorists through obliga-
tions imposed on other countries.120
                                                                                                                      
117 See Gellman, supra note 61, at 169 (noting the advice given by Navy general coun-
sel Alberto Mora to “Protect your client.”); see also Comey, supra note 24, at 443 (discussing 
the ramifications of providing a legal blessing to policymakers and operators). 
118 See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 64–65, 163–64. 
119 See David Weissbrodt & Andrea W. Templeton, Fair Trials? The Manual for Military 
Commissions in Light of Common Article 3 and Other International Law, 26 Law & Ineq. 353, 
391–92 (2008) (describing Congress’ motivation for passing the War Crimes Act as ensur-
ing that grave violations of the Geneva Conventions could be prosecuted in the United 
States). 
120 See Taft, supra note 108. There are at least twelve international treaties to which the 
United States is a signatory that operate to assist in the prosecution of international terror-
ists. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
adopted Dec. 9, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-49, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000); International Con-
vention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted Jan. 9, 1998, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 106-6, 37 I.L.M. 249; Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection, done Mar. 1, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-8, 30 I.L.M. 726 (1993); Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, I.M.O. Doc. 
SUA/CON/16/Rev.1, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304; International Maritime Organization, Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 
10, 1988, I.M.O. Doc. SUA/CON/15, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, done Feb. 24, 
1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-19, 27 I.L.M. 627; Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 96-43, 1456 U.N.T.S. 124 (1997); In-
ternational Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 146, U.N. GAOR, 34th 
Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979); Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplo-
matic Agents, adopted Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (1977); Convention 
for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 
U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air-
craft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hague Convention]; 
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 
1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219. 
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 The negative side of this development is that lawyers and other 
government agents who must act in times of crisis fear that they will be 
subject to criminal liability.121 The increasing number of CIA agents 
who take out professional responsibility insurance to protect themselves 
against lawsuits evidences this fear.122 This is a major—if not primary— 
cause of risk-averse action.123 Lawyers become reluctant to sanction 
creative legal actions due to their inability to state with full certainty 
whether such actions will result in criminal exposure, especially with a 
change in administrations and the benefits of hindsight.124 This fear is 
acute in cases where the criminal laws at issue include relativistic and 
ambiguous standards.125 As the Attorney General correctly identified in 
his remarks, the closing off of these avenues by lawyers places the 
United States in a vulnerable security position, especially with regard to 
a growing and amorphous threat like international terrorism.126
 Still, despite the propensity for this development to cause risk-
averse conduct, the decriminalization of the intelligence community is 
incomprehensible after the Bush administration’s rampant disregard 
for the rule of law. Ironically, their attempts to avoid potential criminal 
exposure not only heightened the calls for such prosecutions, but also 
affirmed the need to restrict specific aspects of executive conduct.127
 A realization of the negative effect that potential criminal liability 
has on the creativity and aggressiveness of government actors should 
                                                                                                                      
121 The laws of war, instead, allow for a balance between considerations of humanity 
and military necessity not found in criminal law. See Payam Akhavan, Reconciling Crimes 
Against Humanity with the Laws of War, 6 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 21, 36 (2008). The fear of civil 
liability is also present and affecting government employees. See, e.g., Idema v. Rice, 478 F. 
Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2007); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
122 See Scott Shane, The Question of Liability Stirs Concern at the C.I.A., N.Y. Times, Sept. 
16, 2006, at A12; R. Jeffrey Smith, Worried CIA Officers Buy Legal Insurance, Wash. Post, 
Sept. 11, 2006, at A1. This practice began most notably after the Iran-Contra Scandal. See 
Morning Edition: For CIA Agents, Insurance Sometimes Necessary (NPR radio broadcast Dec. 14, 
2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5052915. 
123 See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 164; Daniel L. Pines, Are Even Torturers Immune from 
Suit? How Attorney General Opinions Shield Government Employees from Civil Litigation and 
Criminal Prosecution, 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 93, 152 (2008). 
124 See Pines, supra note 123, at 131–32. 
125 See R. Jeffrey Smith, War Crimes Act Changes Would Reduce the Threat of Prosecution, 
Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 2006, at A01 (discussing the relative terms “degrading” and “humiliat-
ing” as used in the War Crimes Act). 
126 See Mukasey, supra note 2, at 183. 
127 See Gellman, supra note 61, at 175–76 (rejecting the application of Geneva rules 
for detainees to avoid the application of the War Crimes Act); see also id. at 355 (noting 
that the effort to expand Presidential powers has resulted in a net decrease of those pow-
ers). 
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spurn a narrowing of applicable criminal statutes.128 The goals of such 
a review should be the following: substitute civil liability for criminal 
liability where possible; narrow ambiguous standards to precise actions 
with specific definitions; include a statutory defense for a reasonable 
belief that the actions taken were lawful;129 and require the federal gov-
ernment to provide counsel and indemnify government actors for all 
judgments except where intentional illegal conduct is proven. This re-
view will not alleviate all concerns over the promotion of risk-averse ac-
tion, but will address its root causes without losing the desired deter-
rent effect. 
D. Retaining Objectivity and Independence Through Distance 
 When addressing legal questions that balance national security 
imperatives against civil liberties, a lawyer must also recognize institu-
tional factors that affect judgment. Nothing is more important to the 
role of a counselor than the need for distance from the client.130 A law-
yer must always be aware that an ability to remain objective when con-
sidering a client’s needs, values, and demands is necessary.131 This abil-
ity challenges private lawyers,132 but is much harder in the national 
security arena, where the dual roles of a lawyer as counselor and con-
tributor to policy decisions are blurred.133
                                                                                                                      
 
128 The process should be similar to the one seen in the Military Commissions Act of 
2006 that narrowed the War Crimes Act by expressly criminalizing specific acts. See Azra B. 
Zaidi, The Military Commissions Act and Its Impact on Our Justice System, 25 Buff. Pub. Int. L.J. 
1, 17–18 (2007). 
129 Examples would include entrapment by estoppel or innocent intent. See, e.g., Cox v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 568 (1965). 
130 See Greene, supra note 14, at 91; Margulies, supra note 16, at 366. 
131 “[I]t is essential that the general counsel and lawyers on [staff at intelligence agen-
cies] be independent, strong-minded and conceive of the office in a broader role than 
merely serving as the personal legal counsel to the agency head.” Daniel B. Silver, The Uses 
and Misuses of Intelligence Oversight, 11 Hous. J. Int’l L. 7, 13 (1989). Aristotle argued that 
objectivity is also a necessary ingredient to ethics. See Graham, supra note 5, at 26. 
132 Partly in response to these difficulties, the American Bar Association attempted to 
clarify the role of lawyer as distinct from the lawyer’s client. See, e.g., Model Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13 (2007). This Rule applies—at least in theory—to government 
agencies. Id. cmt. 9. See generally E. Norman Veasey & Christine Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, 
Stresses, and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 Bus. Law. 1 (2006). 
133 See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 129–30 (describing the extraordinary influence 
that government lawyers had over war policy in the Bush administration); see also Greene, 
supra note 14, at 105 (discussing how lawyers constitute part of the intelligence agency’s 
operational team); David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 
1981, 2002 (2008) (noting the professional responsibility requirements that JAG attorneys 
retain their independence). In addition, a public lawyer arguably serves a public interest 
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 Consider the role of David Addington in the Bush administration. 
As counsel and then Chief of Staff to Vice President Dick Cheney, 
Addington played a central role in many of the most important and 
criticized events of the past eight years.134 Addington’s professional as-
sociation with Cheney reaches back to the 1980s when he was counsel 
to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.135 Cheney, 
as a representative from Wyoming, sat on that panel.136 They remained 
colleagues and friends, and, importantly, shared an ideological view of 
executive power that became a linchpin in policy decisions after the 
2000 election.137 Though Addington’s role in the Bush administration 
was as a legal counselor, he regularly attended strategy sessions on is-
sues such as how to discredit Joseph Wilson after his public criticism of 
the Bush administration.138 To this date, there is no solid evidence that 
Addington broke the law, but his relationship with Cheney suggests a 
role devoid of the distance necessary to remain objective.139 Though it 
remains speculation, it is reasonable to surmise that this closeness hin-
dered Addington in the provision of solid counsel.140
 To provide sound counsel, a lawyer must avoid such excessive in-
termingling.141 Policing such boundaries is undoubtedly difficult, but it 
may be achieved through an awareness of the costs from such a rela-
                                                                                                                      
that may be more demanding than the situations generally faced by private litigants. See 
Brandeis, supra note 24, at 314, 320. 
134 See Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power: The Legal Mind Behind the White House’s War on Ter-
ror, New Yorker, July 3, 2006, at 44; Dana Milbank, In Cheney’s Shadow, Counsel Pushes the 
Conservative Cause, Wash. Post, Oct. 11, 2004, at A21. 
135 See Milbank, supra note 134; see also Gellman, supra note 61, at 40–41; Goldsmith, 
supra note 3, at 77. 
136 See Milbank, supra note 134. 
137 See id. 
138 See Murray Waas & Paul Singer, Addington’s Role in Cheney’s Office Draws Fresh Atten-
tion, NationalJournal.com (Oct. 30, 2005), http://www.nationaljournal.com/about/ 
njweekly/stories/2005/1030nj1.htm (describing how Wilson accused the Bush administra-
tion of misrepresenting information about a CIA mission to Niger to investigate whether 
Iraq had attempted to obtain uranium). 
139 Former Solicitor General Ted Olson described David Addington as Dick Cheney’s 
“eyes, ears, and voice.” Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 77. One former high-ranking lawyer 
for the Bush administration stated that “Addington was more like Cheney’s agent than like 
a lawyer.” See Mayer, supra note 134. Though the legality of the advice remains question-
able, historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. described Addington’s legal advice in defense of 
torture as “No position taken has done more damage to the American reputation in the 
world—ever.” See id. 
140 See Gellman, supra note 61, at 355. 
141 See Greene, supra note 14, at 91; Margulies, supra note 16, at 366. 
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tionship.142 Government lawyers must avoid being placed in the posi-
tion of a policymaker, 143 just as any lawyer must avoid deciding legal 
issues for his or her client.144 While a lawyer may and must provide le-
gal advice, it is essential that he or she avoid intruding upon the prov-
ince of decision-making—an exercise of power that is reserved to a cli-
ent.145 Where a lawyer fails to self-monitor, the role between lawyer and 
client disappears and the quality of objective counsel diminishes.146
 This breakdown occurs not simply because the lawyer becomes an 
agent of power instead of a legal advisor, but also because the admis-
sion of subjectivity reduces an important quality of counsel. Abraham 
Lincoln described this quality when discussing the character needed by 
all citizens to prevent the growth of despotism and to ensure the per-
petuation of the U.S. political system.147 Lincoln stated that all citizens 
must foster and apply a “cold, calculated, unimpassioned reason” to see 
past emotional appeals that allow for the rise of a Napoleon or a Cae-
sar.148 Lincoln was arguing for the need for objectivity.149
 Reason and objectivity, while important for all citizens, are most 
important for lawyers charged with guiding policymakers on the proper 
balance between national security and civil liberties.150 The ability to 
leverage distance and to apply a well-developed, objective analytical ap-
proach to a problem ensures that the legal opinions accurately reflect 
the needed compromise between those conflicting imperatives.151 While 
                                                                                                                      
142 The costs are not just bad policy and poor counsel. Some legal ethics scholars be-
lieve that Bush administration lawyers may have crossed the ethical line regarding criminal 
conduct for the facilitation of illegal torture methods. See David Luban, Selling Indulgences: 
The Unmistakable Parallel Between Lynne Stewart and the President’s Torture Lawyers, Slate, Feb. 
14, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2113447. 
143 Government lawyers should never be in a position where their role is to justify 
rather than confront governmental policy. See Greene, supra note 14, at 106. 
144 See Brook K. Baker, Traditional Issues of Professional Responsibliity and a Transformative 
Ethic of Client Empowerment for Legal Discourse, 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 809, 841–42 (2000). 
145 Such a clear cut statement is, admittedly, difficult to keep in many areas of law. The 
difficulty of the ideal, however, does not and should not undermine the efforts to reach 
that state. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 Geo. L.J. 2567, 2567–69 (1993) 
(discussing the difficulties of a client-centered approach when practicing poverty law). 
146 “Lawyers who buy into their clients’ goals without reservation, or, worse promote 
their own goals or agendas as their clients’ own, limit their own professional usefulness.” 
Margulies, supra note 16, at 366. 
147 See Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Address Before the Yong Men’s 
Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois January 27, 1838, in Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and 
Writings, supra note 115, at 84–85. 
148 See id. at 84. 
149 See id. at 84–85. 
150 See Margulies, supra note 16, at 366–67; Silver, supra note 131, at 13. 
151 See Margulies, supra note 16, at 366–67; Silver, supra note 131, at 13. 
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lawyers themselves must police these boundaries and ensure objectivity, 
organizations responsible for the resulting government policy must im-
plement these lessons through institutional requirements. These in-
clude forced deliberation on key legal issues and the separation of func-
tions between legal advisors and policymakers—all of which failed to 
occur during the Bush administration.152
E. Preparing for Crisis 
 A national security lawyer should understand that any balance be-
tween national security and civil liberties may be historically unique, 
but that in the broad view it is not without precedent. Understanding 
the lessons of those precedents will aid legal analysis amidst even the 
most stressful, immediate security imperatives.153 A lawyer in such a role 
must, therefore, prepare for the unforeseen crisis. 
 Much is made of the pressures that a lawyer must face when decid-
ing issues of importance to national security. While pressures exist, a 
historically-minded individual will find commonalities that guide many 
of the hard choices.154 Many key legal decisions that the Bush admini-
stration faced after September 11 evidence this point.155 The Terrorist 
Surveillance Program is undeniably similar to the electronic surveil-
lance conducted by the NSA from the late 1950s to the early 1970s.156 
Immigration restrictions and increased surveillance for persons of Arab 
                                                                                                                      
152 See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 61, at 162–68 (describing how David Addington 
drafted a four-page memorandum that rejected Geneva protections for detainees in Af-
ghanistan and circumvented inter-agency review and vetting before getting the President 
to sign the executive order authorizing the action). 
153 The moderating effect of historical knowledge and context is similar to the use of 
precedents in judicial decision-making. See Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial 
Process 20 (1921); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & Econ. 249, 250 (1976). The use of precedent (which relies 
on a line of cases) as opposed to stare decisis (which may focus on one case alone) is a 
more accurate comparison in such a case. See Frederick G. Kempin, Precedent and Stare De-
cisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 Am. J. Legal Hist. 28, 30 (1959). 
154 For example, many comparisons between modern and historical terrorism demon-
strate a similar relationship between the methods employed and the governmental order 
that existed. See Bobbitt, supra note 98, at 23–25. 
155 Ironically, the Bush administration’s defenses of such activities often cherry-pick 
this relevant history to support its position. See, e.g., Dept. of Just., Legal Authorities 
Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the 
President 7–8 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalau- 
thorities.pdf. 
156 See Robert Bloom & William J. Dunn, The Constitutional Infirmity of Warrantless NSA 
Surveillance: The Abuse of Presidential Power and the Injury to the Fourth Amendment, 15 Wm. & 
Mary Bill Rts. J. 147, 148–58 (2006). 
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descent share some racial profiling similarities to the Japanese intern-
ment following the attacks on Pearl Harbor.157 The Bush administra-
tion’s attempt to employ streamlined military commissions to try en-
emy combatants drew many parallels to the commissions used by 
President Roosevelt in 1942 to try eight Nazi saboteurs.158 Even more 
similarities exist with the trial of two additional German saboteurs in 
1945—a process extolled by Secretary of War Henry Stimson to redress 
the mistakes of 1942.159
 The historical parallels that exist between many of the legal deci-
sions that drove key policies during the post-September 11 attacks con-
found even the most strident believer in the maxim that, “what’s past is 
prologue.”160 The Bush administration, at this point in our historical 
analysis, has repeated history in many instances and embraced the very 
same disastrous and embarrassing policies.161 The question that must 
come to every person’s mind who considers this issue is why such his-
torical guidance was ignored during the past seven years. More specifi-
cally, where were the lawyers during this process?162
 It is certainly possible that the lawyers who faced these situations 
were aware of this history but were ignored or not consulted.163 It is 
more likely that key lawyers lacked this historical focus when faced with 
                                                                                                                      
157 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216–18 (describing restrictions imposed on citizens of 
Japanese ancestry); Rachel L. Swarns, Special Registration for Arab Immigrants Will Reportedly 
Stop, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 2003, at A16; Asian American Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, Special Registration: Discrimination and Xenophobia as Government Policy, Nov. 2003, at 4–
5, available at http://www.citylimits.org/images_pdfs/pdfs/SpecialRegistrationReport.pdf 
(providing statistics that 95% of those targeted were Muslim). See generally David Lyon, 
Surveillance After September 11 (2003). This also draws eerie parallels to 1987, when 
plans existed to quarantine persons of Arab descent in the United States if war erupted in 
the Middle East between Israel and various countries. See Lisa Belkin, For Many Arab-
Americans, F.B.I. Scrutiny Renews Fears, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1991, at 11. 
158 See Fisher, supra note 56, at 205–07. 
159 Id. at 207–08. 
160 William Shakespeare, The Tempest act 2, sc. 1. 
161 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5–4, Back Detainee Appeals for Guantanamo, N.Y. 
Times, June 13, 2008, at A1; Linda Greenhouse, Treaty Doesn’t Give Foreign Defendants Special 
Status in U.S. Courts, Justices Rule, N.Y. Times, June 29, 2006, at A22; James Risen & Eric 
Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
162 Judge Stanly Sporkin made a similar peroration during the Savings and Loan Crisis 
of the 1980s. See Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990). 
163 There are many reports of lawyers, including the military Judge Advocates, being 
shut out from the decisions affecting important legal issues. See Seymour M. Hersh, Annals 
of National Security: The Gray Zone, New Yorker, May 24, 2004, at 38 (quoting Scott Horton, 
former chairman of the New York City Bar Association’s Committee on International Hu-
man Rights). 
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time-pressured decisions.164 For the purposes of this Article, judgment 
of past actions is of a little value. Instead, the point is a prospective one. 
If a lawyer seeks to provide counsel on key issues of national security— 
the defining issues of our generation—the preparation for such deci-
sions must begin well before the need arises.165
 This is not simply an appeal to understanding legal precedent. It is 
a call to historical study of national security law in a practical and 
pragmatic manner, akin to Victor Davis Hanson’s call for students to 
study war and the inevitability of conflict rather than focusing solely on 
the desire for peace.166 It is also similar to Thucydides’ statement that 
he would be satisfied if his History of the Peloponnesian War was 
“judged useful by those inquirers who desire exact knowledge of the 
past as an aid to the understanding of the future, which in the course of 
human things must resemble if it does not reflect it . . . .”167 There is no 
denying that the challenges faced in the past will resurface. The need 
now is to prepare the next generation of lawyers who will be entrusted 
with the responsibilities of judgment.168
F. Developing a Record for Judgment 
 Finally, the choice between competing imperatives may provide an 
example to one facing a similar situation in the future.169 The process 
by which important decisions are reached should operate in a manner 
                                                                                                                      
164 Many lawyers in the Bush administration were allegedly given their important posi-
tions due to loyalty and religious affiliation rather than merit and independence. See, e.g., 
Eric Lipton, Colleagues Cite Partisan Focus by Justice Official, N.Y. Times, May 12, 2007, at A1; 
Charlie Savage, Missouri Attorney a Focus in Firings, Boston Globe, May 6, 2007, at A1; Alan 
Cooperman, Bush Loyalist Rose Quickly at Justice, Wash. Post, Mar. 30, 2007, at A15. 
165 In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, many critics point to a lack of historical 
understanding as a major cause of the failures in war strategy, including second-hand ac-
counts that President Bush failed to understand that Arabs in Iraq were divided into Shia 
and Sunni. See George Packer, Dreaming of Democracy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 2003, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 64. 
166 See Victor Davis Hanson, Why Study War, City J. (Summer 2007), available at http:// 
www.city-journal.org/html/17_3_military_history.html. 
167 The Landmark Thucydides, A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian 
War 16 (Robert B. Strassler ed., 1996). 
168 See Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Lawyers as Leaders, 116 Yale L.J. 266, 268 (2007) (arguing 
for the development of methods of thinking that prepare lawyers for leadership, including 
the need for breadth of mind). 
169 The importance of using an accurate, well-developed record is evidenced by the co-
ram nobis suit that overturned Fred Korematsu’s conviction, based on documents that the 
government suppressed at the time of the original litigation. See Korematsu v. U.S., 584 F. 
Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Richard Goldstein, Fred Korematsu, 86, Dies; Lost Key Suit on 
Internment, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 2005, at C13. 
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that allows for peer and historical judgment with a humble recognition 
that mistakes may be made and that the balance reached may be in er-
ror.170 Lawyers have a responsibility to balance these imperatives within 
a process that seeks openness and preserves the facts that led to and 
supported the legal conclusions.171 This not only allows the public to 
judge the specific action contemporaneously, but it provides an accu-
rate and complete factual record for historical analysis and reflection 
upon each specific decision within a broader context.172 This reflection 
provides historical lessons that provide precedent and give guidance.173
 Both the need to avoid insulation of decision-making through se-
crecy and the need to develop an accurate factual record from which 
parties may judge those decisions are challenged today. The Bush ad-
ministration asserted the state secret evidentiary privilege and executive 
privilege with unprecedented breadth.174 Attorney General Mukasey 
himself advised the President to assert executive privilege to discussions 
between Cheney and the FBI.175 The Bush administration took steps to 
limit the use of the Freedom of Information Act for intelligence infor-
mation and to undermine the Presidential Records Act.176 The factual 
                                                                                                                      
 
170 See Heineman, supra note 168, at 270 (concluding with a hope that lawyers will as-
pire to lead “tempered by humility at the complexity, difficulty, discipline, and self-sacrifice 
inherent in the task.”). 
171 Lawyers are governed by multiple rules of Professional Responsibility that require 
openness and honesty to the court and the provision of accurate, comprehensive evidence, 
even if that evidence is damaging to one’s case. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 
(1963); Margaret Love, The Revised ABA Mode Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the 
Work of Ethics 2000, 15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 441 (2002); see also Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 3.3 (discussing duty of candor to the court). 
172 See Landes & Posner, supra note 153, at 250. Historiography depends upon inter-
mediary sources, such as judicial or administrative records, to understand historical facts 
and draw historical lessons. 
173 See Landes & Posner, supra note 153, at 250. 
174 See Dana Priest, Secrecy Privilege Invoked in Fighting Ex-Detainee’s Lawsuit, Wash. Post, 
May 13, 2006, at A03; Henry Lanman, Secret Guarding: The New Secrecy Doctrine So Secret You 
Don’t Even Know About It, Slate, May 22, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2142155. The 
Obama administration does not appear to be backing away from these positions. See John 
Schwartz, Obama Backs Off a Reversal on Secrets, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2009, at A12. 
175 See Dan Eggen, Mukasey Refuses to Prosecute Bush Aides, Wash. Post, Mar. 1, 2008, at 
A02; Laurie Kellman, Bush Claims Privilege to Withhold CIA Leak Records, Boston.com, July 
16, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2008/07/16/bush_ 
claims_executive_privilege_on_cia_leak. The original letter written by Attorney General 
Mukasey to President Bush is available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2008 
0716104027.pdf. 
176 See H.R. Comm. on Gov’t Reform—Minority Staff Special Invesitgation Div., 
Report on Secrecy in the Bush Administration 3–4, 32–34 (2004) (report prepared 
for Rep. Henry Waxman); Exec. Order No. 13233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56025 (Nov. 1, 2001) 
(eliminating the time limit for disclosure of Presidential records); Editorial, Sunshine on 
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justifications for the detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo 
Bay went unchallenged until the Boumediene decision due to the restric-
tion on the collateral challenge of habeas corpus.177 The Bush admini-
stration also sought immunity for telephone companies who may have 
broken the law at the government’s behest.178 Immunity not only insu-
lates the companies and possibly the government from liability, but also 
removes cases from the adjudicatory process, a process that serves to 
place such actions into a factual record and before the public.179 Fi-
nally, and perhaps most atrociously, there are reports about the de-
struction of evidence of interrogation techniques that could include 
torture.180
 Though we still operate in the realm of speculation, government 
lawyers drove or provided pivotal support for the policy positions on 
many of these issues.181 On each of these decisions, one can debate the 
needs of security used to justify the insulation of decisions, practices, or 
information from the public. The fundamental problem, however, is 
that such insulation prevents the proper functioning of an integral 
process of judgment. Regardless of the historical lessons drawn from 
such judgment, the value of hindsight properly based on facts cannot 
                                                                                                                      
History, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 2007; John Wertman, Bush’s Obstruction of History, Wash. Post, 
Feb. 26, 2006, at B07. 
177 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008) (holding that detainees have 
a right to habeas corpus to challenge their detention before an Article III judge); Robert 
Barnes, Justices Say Detainees Can Seek Release, Wash. Post, June 13, 2008, at A1. 
178 See Eric Lichtblau, Senate Votes for Expansion of Spy Powers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2008, 
at A1. 
179 See In re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, 564 F. Supp. 2d 
1109 (N.D. Cal., July 2, 2008) (moving to dismiss based on 50 U.S.C. § 1885a(a)(1)-(5)); 
Hon. William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 Suffolk 
U. L. Rev. 67, 69–71 (2006) (explaining the importance of the jury system and of jury 
pronouncements). 
180 See Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Destroyed 2 Tapes Showing Interrogations, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 
2007, at A1; Glenn Greenwald, “Missing” Evidence is Familiar Bush Pattern, Salon.com, Dec. 
7, 2007, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2007/12/07/cia_evidence. 
181 Both Attorneys General Mukasey and Alberto Gonzales have played prominent 
roles in many of these decisions. See, e.g., Eggen, supra note 175; Hersh, supra note 163; 
Mayer, supra note 134, at 2 (describing the Bush administration’s position on the applica-
bility of the Geneva Conventions to detainees at Guantanamo); Mark Mazzetti & David 
Johnston, Outside Prosecutor to Investigate Destruction of C.I.A. Tapes, Int’l Herald Trib., Jan. 
2, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/02/america/cia.php (noting that the in-
vestigation will look into the role of White House lawyers, including Alberto Gonzales). But 
see Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Was Urged to Keep Interrogation Videotapes, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 2007, 
at A1 (discussing how the decision to destroy interrogation tapes was made without con-
sulting top CIA lawyers). 
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be ignored. It is only through this reflection that historical truths are 
developed and applied to subsequent events.182
 The success or failure of the development of such truths can lead 
to serious consequences for a society. The value of the factual record 
developed during the Nuremberg trials is undeniable, as they stand as 
an intellectual and historical bulwark against Holocaust deniers.183 Af-
ter the end of apartheid in South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Committee led to an emotional healing and understanding among two 
sides of a bitter conflict.184 In Croatia, however, a historical barrier of 
bitterness remains between the Croats and Serbs over the true extent of 
the atrocities wrought by the Ustashe. The number of deaths diverges 
greatly—between 60,000 and 700,000—and still remains a source of 
contention and a hindrance to reconciliation.185
 The point is that facts matter. They matter in understanding the 
atmosphere in which decisions were made and they matter in their con-
tribution to the development of a progressive history—one that at-
tempts to glean lessons from the past to inform decisions of the future. 
An ethical lawyer operating in this realm understands both the need to 
learn that history and to engage in a process that promotes such growth. 
Both elements contribute to sound legal counsel. The lawyer who ap-
plies lessons from the past moderates the instant debate through con-
text and broader historical visions. Similarly, the lawyer who conducts 
                                                                                                                      
182 See Wertman, supra note 176 (“But for better or worse, these records belong to the 
American people and should be available so that future generations can learn from the 
triumphs and failures of our past leaders.”). As Fred Korematsu wrote as amicus curie in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, “Only by understanding the errors of the past can we do better in the 
present.” Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred Korematsu in Support of Petitioner at 3, 542 U.S. 
507 (2004). 
183 See Leila Nadya Sadat, Judgment at Nuremberg: Foreword to the Symposium, 6 Wash. U. 
Global Stud. L. Rev. 491, 499 (2007); cf. Michael P. Sacharf, The International Trial of Slo-
bodan Milosevic: Real Justice or Realpolitik?, 8 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 389, 390 (2001–2002) 
(discussing how a factual record developed through the trial would aid education about 
the atrocities that occurred). 
184 See Cassandra Fox Charles, Truth vs. Justice: Promoting the Rule of Law in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa, 5 Scholar 81, 91–93 (2002–2003); cf. Carstein Stahn, Accommodating Individ-
ual Criminal Responsibility and National Reconciliation: The UN Truth Commission for East Timor, 
95 Am. J. Int’L L. 952, 953 (2001) (noting the twin goals of the Truth Commission for East 
Timor as development of a record to understand the truth and to assist in national recon-
ciliation). 
185 See Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History 5–6 (1993) 
(“Numbers are all that have ever counted in Zagreb. For instance, if you were to say that 
the Croatian Ustashe . . . murdered 700,000 Serbs at Jesenovac . . . you would be recog-
nized as a Serbian nationalist who despises Croats as well as Albanians . . . . But if you were 
to say that the Ustashe fascists murdered only 60,000 Serbs, you would be pegged as a 
Croat nationalist . . . .”); Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War 152 (1997). 
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legal balancing in a manner mindful of the needs for openness and the 
preservation of a factual record contributes to the continued provision 
of moderate counsel. 
II. Implementation 
 The debate over the proper role of a national security lawyer is a 
contentious one with passionate advocates on both sides. It is a debate 
that easily dissolves into the academic and esoteric, but it must translate 
into the practical and pragmatic or be resigned to echo in irrelevance. 
The need for relevance is daunting whenever a resolution must be firm 
enough to withstand dual and often opposing pressures, yet flexible 
enough to apply to unique challenges. 
 The factors discussed above must be internalized and applied by 
the individuals entrusted with national security duties. The following 
list, however, contains aspects of the discussion that may be imple-
mented either institutionally or legislatively to assist legal counsel in the 
national security context. 
• Deliberation. Legal counsel must be allowed and required to de-
liberate with peers within one’s agency and with lawyers of other 
government agencies. In crisis situations that require legal counsel, 
agencies should convene non-hierarchical committees of various 
agency lawyers to deliberate and propose a consensus-based opin-
ion.186 
• Access. Legal counsel must be given the security clearance to access 
the intelligence reporting, intelligence sources, and analysis that 
provide the foundation for assertions of security imperatives.187 
• Office of Legal Counsel Memoranda. For an OLC memorandum 
to have binding legal effect on Executive employees, it must be re-
viewed and signed, though not necessarily approved, by lawyers for 
all cabinet-level departments. 
• Disclosure. A bipartisan Congressional committee should review in 
closed session all OLC memoranda issued during the Bush ad-
                                                                                                                      
186 According to James Comey, John Ashcroft regrets the certification of the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program and stated that the security requirements surrounding the program 
were so tight that he could not get the advice he needed to adjudge its legality. Gellman, 
supra note 61, at 304. 
187 This would prevent policy makers from dividing up the facts provided to each legal 
advisor to guarantee the results they desired. See Gellman, supra note 61, at 287 (describ-
ing Vice President Cheney and David Addington’s use of the bureaucracy to return out-
come determinative decisions). 
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ministration. This committee should make public all memoranda 
not essential to current national security needs and issue the 
equivalent of the 9/11 Commission Report on the substance and 
decision-making process that led to regrettable opinions. 
• Decriminalization of War. A bipartisan Congressional committee 
should review all criminal statutes that cover traditional areas of 
the laws of war. The committee should propose changes to the laws 
that incorporate the elements discussed above. 
Conclusion 
 Lawyers are up to the task of moderating government action even 
in the most stressful, challenging times. In fact, it is the tough question 
and the courageous answer that define our profession. A resolute de-
termination to do law and do it righteously, however, will by itself fail to 
guide one through a seemingly intractable dilemma. Instead, a lawyer 
must prepare for such moments by developing and putting into prac-
tice an ethical and decision-making framework that defines the compet-
ing velocities and seeks moderation. A lawyer must leverage the culti-
vated skill of objectivity and ensure client distance to see issues for what 
they are and not look through the lens of systemic bias. A lawyer must 
have limits; just as one must be capable of ranking degrees of threats, so 
too must the lawyer play the obstructionist when action entails an im-
permissible cost. 
 These qualities may appear as unobtainable ideals, and a full em-
brace and effectuation by any fallible person seems unrealistic. Just as 
our recent history raises concerns about how many in our government 
have handled such balancing, however, recent events also highlight the 
ability of many to shoulder that duty. A full account of the events that 
occurred within the government and military after September 11 is still 
in development. The story that is emerging puts lawyers at the center of 
many atrocious decisions, but also at the forefront of courageous ac-
tions. The military Judge Advocates have shown during this war on ter-
rorism an unfailing commitment to civil liberties, while upholding their 
sworn duties to protect and serve the nation.188 They have suffered per-
sonal loss, including the sacrifice of careers and promotions, to follow 
                                                                                                                      
188 See generally Ellen Yaroshefsky, Military Lawyering at the Edge of the Rule of Law at Guan-
tanamo: Should Lawyers Be Permitted to Violate the Law, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 563 (describing the 
stories of Lt. Cdr. Charles Swift, Maj. Michael Dan Mori, and Lt. Cdr. Matthew Diaz); Hersh, 
supra note 163 (describing the JAGs actions in response to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s 
disregard for the Geneva Conventions). 
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their convictions.189 Civilian lawyers, such as James Comey, Jack Gold-
smith, Patrick Philbin, and even John Ashcroft, have demonstrated the 
ability to say no to programs that violated an expanded view of legal 
constraints in an atmosphere of immense pressure and dire responsibil-
ity.190 They did so not as mere obstructionists, but as lawyers who 
sought to put extralegal programs on sound legal foundations.191
 The task now is to analyze what contributed to and hindered the 
provision of sound legal advice during the period after September 11. 
It is to isolate and consider the various factors that affect the lawyer in a 
national security context and to reach pragmatic and practical solutions 
to those problems. In doing so, we provide our best chance at develop-
ing a system where proper restraints against government overreaching 
are imposed and a devastating backlash of risk-averse retrenchment is 
avoided. 
                                                                                                                      
189 See Yaroshefsky, supra note 188, at 571 (noting that Lt. Cdr. Swift was passed over for 
promotion and forced into retirement). 
190 See Gellman, supra note 61, at 291–305 (describing the efforts of civilian lawyers in 
the Bush administration to fix the Terrorist Surveillance Program). 
191 See id. at 291 (describing Jack Goldsmith’s desire to fix the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program and not simply stop it). 
